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ABSTRACT

Cassens, Ronda E. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2015. The Effectiveness of
Behavior-Based Safety in the Flight Training Environment. Major Professor: James P.
Greenan.

Although flight training accounts for an eighth of the total flying in general aviation,
nearly one-third of midair collisions occur during instructional flights. Initiating clearing
turns prior to training maneuvers is an important means of preventing a midair collision.
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to determine (a) Which human factors are
causing the discrepancies between procedures and practice with respect to clearing turns,
and are those discrepancies reduced through the implementation of behavior-based safety
(BBS)? and (b) Is there a significant increase in the utilization of clearing turns prior to
the initiation of training maneuvers by students in the flight program after BBS
implementation? The participants in this study were college students and instructors in a
4-year professional pilot program operated under Part 141 regulations. The results of the
study indicated there were several human factors that inhibited clearing turn use by the
students, and that BBS did not have a significant benefit on these factors or the
percentage of clearing turns that were performed by the students. However, due to
several limitations of this study, further research is recommended to determine the true
effect of BBS on safe behaviors in the flight training environment.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Nature of the Problem
Aviation is a high-risk industry. It involves ever changing weather conditions,
hazards, and high stress environments that when combined, can lead to disastrous
consequences. While these risks cannot be eliminated entirely, it is the responsibility of
the pilot to minimize risk as much as possible to complete the flight safely. Yet, the
pilot’s actions or inactions in response to risks encountered in flight were responsible for
74% of non-fatal accidents and 70% of fatal accidents in 2010 (Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, 2012). Unfortunately, this number has remained fairly stable over the
years despite the pilot training and safety initiatives of organizations such as the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA).
As stated in the 22nd Annual Joseph T. Nall Report (Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, 2012), “One thing that just doesn’t seem to change annually is the excess
risk that some pilots are willing to take on for personal flights” (p. 3). It stands to reason
that if the risk-taking behavior of pilots could be reduced, the number of accidents would
also likely decline.
The nature of the risk that is experienced by pilots has changed over time.
Strauch (2004) stated that “human, organizational and systematic factors, rather than
technical or operational issues, now dominate the risks to most hazardous industries” (p.
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xi). The increase over time in accidents caused by human error may be attributed to
increasingly complex systems being managed by humans who have not advanced as
quickly. Human beings are not perfect, and are subject to different types of errors. These
errors cannot be eliminated, but it is possible to reduce the opportunities for errors to
occur. It is important to note; however, that as more safety features or people are added
to an operation, there is a potential to increase the chance of error through increased
complexity (Strauch, 2004). It is assumed that errors are unintentional, and there are
characteristics within the system that have caused these errors called precursors or
antecedents. Examples of antecedents include equipment, equipment operators,
organization, maintenance, multi-operator systems, and culture of the organization.
These antecedents are often hidden, but they can be exposed by investigating the action,
situation, or factor that caused the person to commit the error (Strauch, 2004). There are
three main categories of pilot error: procedural, perceptual-motor, and decisional (Diehl,
Hwoschinsky, Livack, & Lawton, 1987; Jensen, 1995). Procedural errors occur due to
insufficient knowledge of aircraft systems. Perceptual-motor errors stem from the pilot
misjudging sensory cues and aircraft control inputs. Decisional errors are the most
deadly, and account for 71% of the fatal accidents caused by pilot error (Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association, 2009).
Many companies employ some form of safety program to make employees aware
of workplace hazards and correct safety procedures; however, they are often unsuccessful
at reducing accidents because they focus on the attitudes of the employees rather than the
behaviors that are causing the accidents (Loafmann, 1998; Reynolds, 1998). Simply
telling people how to be safe does not always result in them actually behaving safely.
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Also, typical safety programs are reactionary in that once an accident occurs, methods are
implemented to prevent its future occurrence. Behavior-based safety (BBS) addresses
these shortcomings by focusing on the employee’s behavior. This is accomplished
through monitoring accident trends, pinpointing safe behaviors, collecting data on the
frequency of safe behaviors, and providing feedback to employees on a regular basis.
BBS has been shown to be highly effective in reducing accidents in industrial settings
(Krause, 2001; Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000; Wilson, 2004), and has the potential to
reduce the number of accidents in the aviation industry as well.

Statement of the Problem
Accidents involving midair collisions are rare, but when they do occur, nearly half
of them result in fatalities. A search of the National Transportation Safety Board’s
aviation accident database resulted in 116 reports including the terms midair collision
(MAC) resulting in an accident in the United States between 2000-2012. The NTSB files
one report for each registered aircraft involved in a midair accident, and upon further
analysis of the data, there were a total of 60 midair accidents during that timeframe
involving 120 aircraft resulting in 72 deaths. There were two reports that did not have a
corresponding report filed for the other aircraft involved in the incident. This was due to
the type of aircraft and one report where a witness claimed there were two aircraft
involved, but radar imagery indicated only a single aircraft. Sixteen of the reports
involved aircraft on training flights, totaling 13 MAC incidents, eight of which were fatal
resulting in 20 deaths. Midair collisions were ranked as the 9th highest cause of fatal
general aviation accidents from 2001 to 2011 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012).
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Many of the accident reports cited the pilot’s failure to “see and avoid” the other
traffic as the cause of the midair collision. According to the Federal Aviation
Regulations, 91.113(b): “When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an
operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall
be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.”
According to The FAA’s Advisory Circular 90-48C, “The Pilots’ Role in Collision
Avoidance”: “Pilots should…execute appropriate clearing procedures before all turns,
abnormal maneuvers, or acrobatics” (1983, p. 3). The Aeronautical Information Manual
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2014) more specifically states that “appropriate
clearing procedures should precede the execution of all turns including chandelles, lazy
eights, stalls, slow flight, climbs, straight and level, spins, and other combination
maneuvers” (section 4-4-15). It is also noted in the Airplane Flying Handbook that
“proper clearing procedures, combined with proper visual scanning techniques, are the
most effective strategy for collision avoidance” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004,
p. 1.5). The collegiate flight training program in this study also specifies clearing turns in
the procedures for each maneuver in the materials distributed to students. The purpose of
a clearing turn is to ensure that the maneuver being performed will not result in a
collision with another aircraft, and consists of turns to allow the pilot to completely scan
the area around the aircraft, typically consisting of 180° of heading change. Despite these
recommendations and explicit procedures, some pilots in the collegiate training program
fail to execute clearing turns.
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Purpose and Objectives of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine if BBS could effectively motivate
students to complete a clearing turn prior to every training maneuver. The objectives of
this study, therefore, included:
1. Identify those human factors that cause the discrepancies between
procedures and practice with respect to clearing turns, and assess whether
or not those discrepancies are reduced through the implementation of
BBS.
2. Determine if there is a significant increase in the frequency of clearing
turns completed by students in the flight program when BBS is
implemented into flight training.

Research Questions
To determine the effectiveness of BBS in the flight training environment, the
following research questions were posited:
1. Which human factors are causing the discrepancies between procedures
and practice with respect to clearing turns, and are those discrepancies
reduced through the implementation of BBS?
2. Is there a significant increase in the utilization of clearing turns prior to the
initiation of training maneuvers by students in the flight program after
BBS implementation?
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Significance of the Study
Over the years, various aviation organizations have attempted to reduce the
frequency of accidents caused by pilot error. The FAA recently announced its initiative
to reduce the number of accidents caused by pilot error by 10% by 2018 (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2012). Behavior-based safety has been used in a wide variety
of industry, including building construction, shipyards, paper mills, and chemical
companies. Although most BBS applications have been in non-aviation industries, its
fundamental concepts can be applied to the flight training environment (Olson & Austin,
2006). Olson and Austin’s study, however, was not a full implementation of BBS and
focused primarily on determining areas where unsafe operations were occurring. It was
intended to contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the effectiveness of BBS in
flight training and provide a means of assisting pilots in becoming safer in all aspects of
flight. Additionally, the human factors analysis and classification system, or HFACS,
was used in this study as a means of determining where errors were occurring and to
allow for a more focused approach to training and accident prevention. The HFACS
model has been used traditionally as a method to aid in accident analysis; however, this
study used it in a proactive manner to help prevent accidents. This application of HFACS
has not been used widely in research. Perhaps, it can be useful to those personnel who
supervise safety programs; thereby, it may assist in reducing the number of accidents
caused by human error.
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Delimitations of the Study
This study was limited to examining the effectiveness of BBS on students in a
Midwestern, Part 141 collegiate aviation program. It did not include student training
outside of a collegiate setting. The professional pilot program enrolls only undergraduate
students; therefore, no graduate students were involved in the study. The study addressed
one-on-one instruction in the aircraft as well as solo flights; it did not include the
evaluation of BBS in classroom instruction. The study did not involve any of the
investigator’s students in order to minimize researcher bias. Additionally, it did not
address flight instructor training. Further, the population and sample in the study was
relatively small due to the number of students enrolled in the professional pilot program;
accordingly, the results have limited generalizability.

Assumptions of the Study
Some of the data collected for this study were based on self-reporting. Therefore,
it was assumed that the students and instructors were frank and honest in their responses.
There is, however, the possibility that the participants may have provided socially
acceptable responses. It was also assumed that the students were not consistently
performing clearing turns based on the researcher’s observations during stage checks and
instructional flights. The researcher was aware of this potential bias and did not conduct
any behavioral observations during the study.
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Definition of Terms
Behavior-based Safety (BBS): A proactive approach to accident prevention through
targeting errors by identifying safe behaviors, observing behaviors to collect data,
using feedback to encourage desired behaviors, and using the data collected to
facilitate improvements in safety (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2000).
Certified Flight Instructor (CFI): A person who is authorized within the limitations of
that person's flight instructor certificate and ratings to give training and
endorsements toward a pilot certificate and/or rating (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2011).
Clearing Turns: A series of turns completed prior to initiating a maneuver that allows a
pilot to visually scan the area for other aircraft to ensure that the maneuver being
performed will not result in a collision with another aircraft (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2004).
General Aviation (GA): Flights that do not involve a commercial airline or the military.
It includes flights for personal purposes, such as aircraft used by corporations or
for pleasure flights (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 2010).
Human Error: When a person commits or intends to commit an act that results in a
consequence that is different from what he or she expected or intended. It is
commonly caused by latent characteristics embedded within complex systems that
have the potential to cause an error (Strauch, 2004).
Maneuver: An intended variation from straight and level flight. It includes stalls, spins,
slow flight, steep turns, chandelles, lazy eights, and any other procedure required
by the FAA practical test standards (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014).
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Midair Collision: An occurrence where at least two aircraft unintentionally collide while
airborne (de Voogt & van Doorn, 2006) due to the failure of one or both pilots
seeing and avoiding the other aircraft.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In most organizations, behavior contributes to 86% to 96% of all injuries
(McSween, 2003). It follows that targeting unsafe behavior and the environment that
causes it will help to decrease the amount of injuries in the workplace. This is the
premise of behavior-based safety (BBS). BBS is defined as “a set of methods to improve
safety performance in the workplace by engaging workers in the improvement process,
identifying critical safety behaviors, performing observations to gather data, providing
feedback to encourage improvement, and using gathered data to target system factors for
positive change” (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2000, p. 1). Although BBS is
primarily used in manufacturing, its fundamental concepts can also be applied to
improving safety in flight training. The literature review examines the concept of human
error and its causes and prevention. It also provides an overview of BBS as an approach
to error prevention through targeting unsafe behavior, its development and
implementation, and potential applications of BBS in the flight training environment.

Nature of Human Error
It is easy to blame pilots when an accident occurs; they are closest to the actual
event. However, in most cases, there is a series of factors that lead to an accident,
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making the concept of human error more complicated than it seems at first glance.
According to Reason (1997):
“…human error is a consequence not a cause. Errors…are shaped and provoked
by upstream workplace and organizational factors. Identifying an error is merely
the beginning of the search for causes, not the end. The error, just as much as the
disaster that may follow it, is something that requires an explanation. Only by
understanding the context that provoked the error can we hope to limit its
recurrence” (p. 126).
In a similar vein, Cooper (2000) stated, “to greater or lesser degrees, accident
causation models recognize the presence of an interactive or reciprocal relationship
between psychological, situational, and behavioural factors” (p. 117). For example, an
organization may say that they put safety first, but safety first can vary depending on
situational factors such as the technologies available, the type of organization, and
external market pressures (Atak & Kingma, 2011). These factors can combine to create a
safety culture that is susceptible to risk-taking and ultimately accidents. A poor safety
culture was stated as a major factor in many of the well- known organizational accidents
such as the Challenger Space Shuttle explosion, the King’s Cross Underground fire, the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Reason, 1998), and most recently the Deepwater Horizon oil
rig explosion in 2010 (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and
Enforcement, 2011). Organizations typically have many defenses in place to prevent
major disasters such as these, which suggests that several failures within the system must
align to result in an accident. This concept is called the “Swiss cheese model” (see
Figure 1), which is an accident causation theory developed by Reason (1998). According
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to Reason (1998), each slice of cheese represents the organization’s defenses. These
cheese slices have holes in them, which represent active failures (violations caused by the
human-system interface) and latent failures (failure of those in charge of the system to
plan for all possible scenarios). By themselves, active and latent failures do not result in
an accident, but when the conditions are right, the holes can align and lead to an accident.
A poor safety culture can be a prime instigator of holes within the defense system since
safety culture is something that permeates throughout the entire organization. Reason
(1998) stated that “only culture can affect all the ‘cheese slices’ and their associated
holes” (p. 297).

Figure 1. Reason's Swiss Cheese Model
According to Reason (1998), there are three ways that a poor safety culture can
weaken an organization’s defenses against accidents. First, it increases the number of
active failures within the system through non-compliance with established safety
procedures, allowing more opportunities for an accident to penetrate the defenses.
Second, it creates complacency towards safety in its members by failing to emphasize the
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dangers of the particular operation. Lastly, and most critically, a poor safety culture will
allow deficiencies in its defenses to perpetuate, and even encourage members to bypass
the defenses in the name of profit and production.
Accidents are rarely random; there are typically certain aspects common to each
reoccurring accident. Reason (1998) called these common aspects universals, local traps,
and drivers. Universals are hazards that are always present in an activity. An example of
a type of aviation universal would be weather such as thunderstorms or high winds.
Local traps are ones that, when combined with human error, cause a person to be drawn
into unsafe actions (e.g. pressure to complete a flight to make it to a meeting). Drivers
are what compel a person to fall into a local trap. Reason (1998) considers the driver in
this case to be the safety culture of an organization, since conflicts can arise between the
goals of the safety program and production when a poor safety culture exists. For
example, in a study conducted by Atak and Kingma (2011), there was an extreme amount
of pressure on an aircraft mechanic to get aircraft repaired and flying as quickly as
possible, yet also do a quality job. These conflicting pressures often resulted in the
mechanic taking shortcuts to satisfy both demands even though he knew that this did not
conform to established safety standards. Early in the oil drilling industry (1966-1980),
the culture was a fast work pace that resulted in high amounts of risk and a high accident
rate (Haukelid, 2008). Richter and Koch (2004) determined that a packaging company’s
high accident rates, where 25% of the workers had been injured over a five-year period,
may have been attributed to a focus on economy and productivity, as well as the
company’s valuing an employee’s ability to minimize production issues, leading to
increased risk taking. Reason (1998) concluded:
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“The same cultural drivers - time pressure, cost-cutting, indifference to hazards
and the blinkered pursuit of commercial advantage - act to propel different people
down the same error-provoking pathways to suffer the same kinds of accidents.
Each organization gets the repeated accidents it deserves. Unless these drivers are
changed and the local traps removed, the same accidents will continue to happen”
(p. 302).
An organization that is proactive in seeking the holes in its defenses that could promote
errors can prevent an accident before it happens.
One of the limitations of Reason’s model, however, is that it does not give any
indication regarding what these holes may be, as noted by Wiegmann and Shappell
(2003), “After all, as a safety officer or accident investigator, wouldn’t you like to know
what the holes in the ‘cheese’ are? Wouldn’t you like to know the types of organizational
and supervisory failures that ‘trickle down’ to produce failed defenses at the
preconditions or unsafe acts level?” (p.49). Through extensive accident analysis,
Shappell and Wiegmann (1997) developed the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS, see Figure 2), which incorporated accident causal
categories into Reason’s four levels of failure: unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts,
unsafe supervision, and organizational influences.
Unsafe acts are comprised of errors and violations (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Errors can be mental or physical and are further divided into skill-based, decision, and
perceptual errors. Skill-based errors are those that result from a behavior that has become
automated. These automated behaviors can be disrupted by distractions, lapses in
memory, or poor technique. When an action is carried out as planned, but the plan is
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faulty, it is considered a decision error (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). There are three
types of decision errors: procedural errors, poor choices, and problem solving errors. In
aviation, there are many procedures in place to help keep pilots safe, but when a pilot
applies a procedure that is not appropriate for the situation, it is considered a procedural
error. A poor choice error occurs when a pilot selects the wrong action when dealing
with a situation for which there is no procedure. There are times when a pilot is faced
with a situation that he or she has never encountered and for which there is no known
procedure for handling the specific situation. The pilot then must determine what to do,
often in a very limited timeframe. Perceptual errors occur when the pilot makes an
incorrect response to limited and possibly faulty sensory input.
Violations, in contrast to errors, are the purposeful violation of the rules, and
occur in two forms: routine and exceptional (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Routine
violations are generally tolerated by those in charge, which encourages more and more
people to violate the rules as commonplace behavior. Exceptional violations, however,
are neither part of a person’s normal behavior nor are they tolerated.
The next area of the HFACS model includes preconditions for unsafe acts
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). These preconditions include the condition of the
operators, personnel factors, and environmental factors. The operator’s ability to perform
can be affected by conditions such as adverse mental and/or physiological states, as well
as physical and/or mental limitations. Interactions between crew members and how they
prepare themselves for a flight can contribute to personnel factors in an accident.
Environmental factors consist of the physical and technological environment. The
physical environment can be the temperature and noise in the cockpit, weather, or terrain;
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whereas, the technological environment consists of how the operator interacts with the
technology.
The categories of unsafe operations are inadequate supervision, planned
inappropriate operations, failure to correct problem, and supervisory violations
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Poor training and guidance can lead to errors and
violations. Planned inappropriate actions involve management making poor decisions,
such as overloading workers with tasks or not providing adequate rest periods. When
there are known deficiencies in areas such as training or the work environment, but
management fails to correct them, it lies in the category of failure to correct a known
problem. Lastly, supervisory violations occur when supervisors purposely ignore rules or
regulations.
The final area is organizational influences. Organizational influences are resource
management, organizational climate, and organizational process (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2003). When allocating resources, management often has to make decisions based on the
potentially conflicting goals of safety and production. Sometimes the less expensive,
riskier alternative is chosen due to cost-saving. Organizational climate consists of the
atmosphere in which the employees work. Climate is influenced by culture, which
includes the unspoken rules, values, attitudes, and beliefs of the organization. The
organizational process refers to the procedures created by management that provide
guidance to the workers. It can also include items such as quotas, time pressure, and
operational tempo.
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Figure 2. Wiegmann and Shappell's HFACS Model
In contrast to the human error theories created by Reason (1998) and Wiegmann
and Shappell (2003), Dekker (2005) proposed ignoring errors, wrongdoing, and
violations. He states, “to understand safety, an organization needs to capture the
dynamics in the banality of its organizational life and begin to see how the emergent
collective moves toward the boundaries of safe performance” (p. 31). An organization
does not instantaneously develop unsafe tendencies. Instead, it tends to drift into failure,
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often unknown to those within the organization and even sometimes undetected by those
who are on the outside (Dekker, 2005). Organizations learn and adapt over time, and
when there are conflicting goals, such as safety and production, people have to find ways
to adapt. Every time the adaptation is successful (i.e., no accident), it encourages further
deviations that make it difficult for those within the organization to notice that they are
incrementally moving away from what was originally considered safe until an accident
happens. Then “the holes found in the layers of defense …are easy to discover once the
rubble is strewn before one’s feet” (Dekker, 2005, p. 29). To take a proactive approach,
an organization has to closely examine its everyday, mundane activities to detect
evidence of the drift away from safe performance. When an organization makes a
conscious effort to discover and understand the gap between procedures and practice,
they can improve their level of safety. It is also important for organizations to teach their
employees when it is acceptable to adapt and how to adapt instead of simply telling them
to follow procedures. This will develop their ability to deal with novel situations.
“Work, especially that in complex, dynamic workplaces, often requires subtle,
local judgments with regard to timing of subtasks, relevance, importance,
prioritization and so forth…. Safety, then, is not the result of rote rule following;
it is the result of people’s insight into features of situations that demand certain
actions, and people being skillful at finding and using a variety of resources
(including written guidance) to accomplish their goals” (Dekker, 2005, pp. 138139).
By examining the gaps between desired and actual behavior, an organization can detect
the gradual drift into failure before it is too late.
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Behavior-based Safety
Behavior-based safety was designed to target errors through identifying safe
behaviors, observing behaviors to collect data, using feedback to encourage desired
behaviors, and using the data collected to facilitate improvements in safety. This process
is a proactive approach to preventing accidents, which in turn reduces injury and
production-related costs to the company. Many companies employ some form of safety
program to make employees aware of workplace hazards and correct safety procedures.
They are, however, often unsuccessful at reducing accidents because they focus on the
attitudes of the employees rather than the behaviors that are causing the accidents
(Loafmann, 1998; Reynolds, 1998). These programs usually educate employees on how
to be safe, but this does not always result in them actually behaving safely when they are
on the work floor. According to Loafmann (1998), “behavior-based safety is an effective
way to close the gap between what people know they should do and what they actually
do” (p. 21). Also, typical safety programs are reactionary in that once an accident
occurs, methods are implemented to prevent its future occurrence; whereas, BBS takes a
proactive approach through frequent measurement of behavior and problem solving.
Accordingly, injury and production related costs to the company are reduced (Komaki,
Barwick, & Scott, 1978; Krause, Hidley, & Hodson, 1990; McSween, 2003; Olson &
Austin, 2006). It has been shown that within 3 to 5 years after companies implement
BBS, injury rates are reduced by 60% to 90% (Wilson, 2004).
The concept of BBS originated in the behavioral sciences, which focus on an
individual’s behavior and how the environment affects that behavior (Krause et al.,
1990). Behavioral science includes the field of study called applied behavioral analysis
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(ABA), and from this field emerged various methods of behavior modification, which use
scientific research methodology to create a change in behavior. The first inception of
BBS relied on supervisors to apply behavior modification methods to improve safety.
Supervisors would observe the employees, give them feedback, and then provide either
positive or negative reinforcement (Cooper, 2009). This method was not entirely
effective, since removing the reinforcement usually resulted in a return of the undesired
behavior. In the 1980s, the BBS model became more centered on the worker as a change
agent, with the supervisors providing a support function (Krause, 2001). This was largely
due to the fact that total quality management (TQM) had become very popular during this
time, which promoted the concept of employee involvement.
The basis of BBS are the ABCs: antecedent, behavior, and consequence, where
antecedent is the stimulus that prompts behavior, and the consequence is what reinforces
or discourages the repetition of the behavior (Krause et al., 1990). A change in behavior
can only be achieved by changing the consequences (Krause et al., 1990; McSween,
2003; Reynolds, 1998). Krause and Sloat (1993) explained the importance of
consequences through the analogy of a ringing telephone. Many people believe that the
ringing of a telephone causes people to respond to the phone, when in fact the ringing is
actually an antecedent to the behavior of answering the phone. The consequence is
having someone to talk to on the other end. If there is a telephone that rings constantly,
but no one is there to talk to when the phone is picked up, people will stop responding to
the phone when it rings. Safety meetings can provide employees with encouragement
and information (antecedents) to perform their job safely; however, without
consequences, they can be ineffective in changing behavior.
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Not only must there be consequences, they must be soon, certain, and positive
(Geller, 2000; Krause & Sloat, 1993; Loafmann, 1998; McSween, 2003; Reynolds,
1998). According to Reynolds (1998), “people respond more predictably to small,
immediate, certain consequences than to large, future, uncertain ones” and “rewards not
tied to specific behaviors do little to promote performance improvement” (p. 25). The
consequences in the workplace do not need to be complicated or expensive, but should
include incentive/reward programs and interpersonal recognition such as verbal praise
(Geller, 2000).
Another important aspect of behavior change is feedback, and like consequences,
it also must be soon, certain, and positive to change behavior effectively. According to
Loafmann (1997), “when people receive feedback daily, they can see how that day’s
attempts to use safe behaviors compare with attempts the day before. Then, improvement
feels like a game in which winning is an exciting possibility” (p. 38). Daily feedback
also aids in identifying obstacles to safe behaviors and helps develop and reinforce safe
behaviors.
When implemented correctly, BBS “represents one of the few safety
improvement methods to have solid, scientifically-based data to support its effectiveness”
(Krause, 2001, p. 28). Sulzer-Azaroff and Austin (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 33
data-based evaluations of behavioral safety programs that were implemented in a wide
variety of work settings in several countries, and with various numbers of employees and
facilities. They found that 32 of the articles reviewed revealed reductions in the
occurrence of accidents and incidents. However, they caution that there may be some
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bias in the results since the research presenting poor results may have not been submitted
or rejected for publication (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000).
An overview of several other studies involving BBS effectiveness follows, each
involving petroleum refining (Medina, McSween, Rost, & Alvero, 2009), bus
transportation (Olson & Austin, 2001), food manufacturing (Komaki et al., 1978), and
three involving flight training (Olson & Austin, 2006; Rantz, Dickinson, Sinclair, & Van
Houten, 2009; Rantz & Van Houten, 2011). The study involving petroleum refining
reported a 30% increase in safe behavior over the course of the study (Medina et al.,
2009). The bus transportation study found a 12.5% overall increase in safe behavior over
several behavioral areas, with individual areas ranging from 6% to 22% (Olson & Austin,
2001). In the food manufacturing study, two separate work shifts achieved a 21% to 26%
increase in safe behaviors (Komaki et al., 1978). The research study conducted by Olson
and Austin (2006) involving flight training primarily focused on the first step of BBS,
identifying safety concerns through error tracking during the landing phase to determine
where students were having the most problems. On dual flights, the highest number of
errors occurred during flare, follow-through after touchdown, turn from base to final
approach, and overall final approach. On solo flights, the highest number of errors were
turn from base to final approach, angle of descent, flare, and touchdown centerline (Olson
& Austin, 2006). In the two studies on checklist use by pilots enrolled in a collegiate
flight program, the main focus was the effectiveness of the feedback portion of BBS
(Rantz et al., 2009; Rantz & Van Houten, 2011). These studies reported that when the
pilots received feedback on their checklist performance after each session in the form of
verbal praise and visual indicators (charted data), their correct use of checklists increased
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from a mean of 53% to 91% in one study and 39% to nearly 100% in the other study.
The results were maintained even after the intervention was withdrawn.

Techniques for Implementing Behavior-based Safety
There are several benefits to implementing BBS. The first is that it focuses on
changing the cause of the behavior instead of simply blaming the employee. Creating a
change in behavior is a systematic process that continues over time. Another benefit is
that the employees are involved in the process, which increases their motivation to
participate. Lastly, it provides quantifiable data that can be used for progress updates and
further improvements in safety (Krause, 2001).
There has also been some criticism of BBS, especially the earlier versions where
the supervisors directed behavior without employee input. Smith (1999) lists several
shortcomings of early BBS models, such as ignoring the internal reasons for behavior,
ignoring the working environment as a cause of accidents, and excluding the worker from
the process, which promotes the concept of command-and-control management. He
states that BBS does not fit well with the concept of quality management that had also
become popular during the 1980s, because it eliminates internal motivation through the
use of positive and negative reinforcement and top-down processes. Smith believed that
“quality management systems—not BBS—will drive the safety management model that
will be used in the 21st century and beyond” (p. 40). Proper use of BBS addresses the
majority of these issues, and even closely coincides with the core concepts of quality
management (Krause et al., 1990), precisely as Smith (1999) asserted. Additional
criticisms of BBS are that it places blame on the employees, takes away management’s
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responsibility for safety, and is manipulative (Blair, 1999). However, the aforementioned
problems often arise from the misuse of behavior modification concepts, resulting in
unsuccessful implementation. Therefore, it is important to understand the most effective
ways to use BBS concepts to ensure the success of the program.
Over time, BBS has evolved to become more effective at modifying behaviors.
The first attempts at BBS involved training supervisors in the academic concepts of
behavior modification and expecting them to apply those lessons to the real world
without guidance on how to do so (Krause et al., 1990). This resulted in supervisors
incorrectly applying what they learned or reverting to more familiar safety management
techniques. This led to the need to create a process that involved the concepts of
organizational development, which focuses on both training and implementation (Krause
et al., 1990). The successful implementation of BBS relies on seven principles described
by Geller (2005, p. 540) that can be used effectively in real world applications: (a) focus
on observable behavior, (b) look for external factors to understand and improve behavior,
(c) direct with antecedents and motivate with consequences, (d) focus on positive
consequences to motivate behavior, (e) apply the scientific method to improve
intervention, (f) use theory to integrate information, not to limit possibilities, and (g)
design interventions with consideration of internal feelings and attitudes.
The first key principle, focus on observable behavior, involves simply observing
what people do and then targeting unsafe behaviors. Once an unsafe behavior is
identified, it is important to look for external factors to understand and improve behavior.
The external factors that are causing the unsafe behavior can then be modified to elicit a
change in behavior. The third principle is to direct behavior with antecedents and
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motivate with consequences. This principle is based on the ABC concept, where A is the
antecedent (or activator), B is the behavior, and C is the consequence. Antecedents are
signals that elicit a certain behavior, and they can be internal or external (Geller, 1999).
People are more likely to respond to an antecedent if they know that it will produce a
pleasant consequence or allow them to avoid an unpleasant consequence (Geller, 2005).
It is important to understand the two types of rewards or feedback to be successful in
changing behavior (Geller, 1999). When a reward is offered as an antecedent, it
motivates a behavior. When a reward is used as a consequence (given after the desired
behavior), it supports the behavior. The appropriate method of reward or feedback
depends on the type of behavior that is being changed.
Geller (1999) defines three types of behavioral transitions: (a) changing a risky
habit (unconscious incompetence) into a self-directed behavior (conscious competence),
(b) changing a risky self-directed behavior (consciously incompetent) into a safe selfdirected behavior (consciously competent), and (c) changing a safe self-directed
behavior (consciously competent) into a safe habit (unconsciously competent). There are
three types of interventions to facilitate the three behavior transitions: instructional,
supportive, and motivational. Instructional intervention, which consists of antecedents
such as training and education, is used to facilitate changing unconscious incompetence
to conscious competence. Supportive intervention, or the use of positive consequences,
is used to change conscious competence into unconscious competence. There are usually
no antecedents associated with supportive intervention since the person is already
motivated to do the right thing and an incentive/reward would be considered demeaning.
When a person is willfully unsafe, even after they are trained in safe procedures,
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motivational interventions must be used which require the use of both antecedents and
consequences. Incentives and rewards are effective motivational interventions (Geller,
1999). Pairing the appropriate intervention with the desired change in behavior will
insure that employees are properly motivated towards safety.
The fourth principle involves focusing on positive consequences to motivate
behavior (Geller, 2005). Negative consequences are often ineffective because the
probability of punishment seems remote, and may even trigger “more calculated risk
taking, even sabotage, theft, or interpersonal aggression” (Geller, 1999, p. 48) due to a
sense of loss of individual freedom. The next principle is to use the scientific method to
improve the intervention, which provides feedback for further improvement (Geller,
2005). This involves the application of DO IT, which stands for Define behavior(s) to
target, Observe to collect baseline data, Intervene to influence target behaviors, and Test
to measure the impact of the intervention. This process is performed in a continuous
loop, and each time it is completed, the employees learn more about improving safety
within their organizations. It is important that the information gathered during DO IT is
not used for punishment purposes, and that the findings are expressed in terms of safe
operations rather than unsafe operations. The sixth key principle is to use theory to
integrate information, not to limit possibilities. The DO IT process will allow employees
to develop theories regarding which interventions work in certain situations and with
which individuals. These theories can then be applied to the development of new types
of interventions to increase their effectiveness. The final key principle is to design
interventions with a consideration towards internal feelings and attitudes. It is important
to consider the impact that an intervention has on individuals since an intervention can
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“increase or decrease feelings of empowerment, build or destroy trust, or cultivate or
inhibit a sense of teamwork or belonging” (Geller, 2005, p. 551). When these key
principles are adhered to, BBS is more likely to be effective in the workplace.
An important aspect of BBS is safety coaching. Behavior-based Safety Coaching
involves one-on-one observation and feedback (Geller, Perdue, & French, 2004). The
role of the safety coach is to encourage safe behaviors while providing useful feedback
on at-risk behaviors. The observational data, collected through observation checklists, is
then compiled and shared with employees. Behaviors that need attention are identified,
and employees form teams to create ways to remove barriers to safe behaviors. The
following list of 10 guidelines is key to implementing a successful BBS coaching system
(Geller et al., 2004).
1. Teach procedures with principles, which consist of motivating people to learn
safe behavior through teaching them the basic premise of BBS. Once they
understand the process and the reasoning behind BBS, they will be more willing
to change.
2. Empower employees to own the process through involving them with designing,
implementing, evaluating, and refining the system. This sense of ownership will
more likely result in behavior change because the employees hold themselves
responsible.
3. Provide opportunities for choice in whether or not to participate, but it is
important to avoid completely voluntary programs since they will usually lack
sufficient support to be effective. Everyone should be expected to get involved to
some degree.
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4. Facilitate supportive involvement from management, which involves showing
employees that what they are doing is being appreciated by their supervisors.
Employees at all levels need to have specific roles in this process.
5. Ensure that the process is non-punitive, since punishment “stifles feelings of trust,
empowerment, ownership, and commitment” (p. 44). It is important that
employees believe that the data collected are anonymous and will not be used
against them in any way. The discovery of at-risk behaviors should only be used
to determine areas in need of improvement.
6. Ensure that the coach is non-directive, which means that they should not correct
at-risk behavior. Their role is to simply encourage the safe behaviors that they
observe.
7. Progress from announced to unannounced observations should be made at an
appropriate time. Although unannounced observations will provide more realistic
data, it can be seen by employees as a means to observe them in the act of doing
something unsafe, which can breed distrust. Once employees recognize that BBS
is for their benefit, observations can become unannounced with the permission of
the workers.
8. Focus on interaction, not just numbers gleaned from the data. While the
numbers provide valuable information as to progress towards safety, conducting
the observations themselves lead to even greater benefits. The process of caring
interaction and feedback by the observer should lead to informal peer coaching,
where employees interact with each other and give feedback in the interest of a
safe and accident free workplace.
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9. Continuously evaluate and refine the process using a combination of the data
gathered through observations, perception surveys, interviews, and focus groups.
This information should be used to make adjustments and improvements to
further target at-risk behaviors.
10. Make the process part of a larger effort by incorporating BBS throughout all
aspects of the organization from training, recognition, and ergonomics.
While peer observations are important to a successful BBS program, BBS
concepts can be applied by a single worker through self-observation (Geller & Clarke,
1999; Krause et al., 1990; McSween, 2003). With the assistance of management and
peers, the worker targets the behaviors he or she wishes to improve and tracks them to
monitor progress. Since the aviation workplace—the cockpit— consists of one or two
pilots, self-observation techniques can be used to improve behavioral safety.
According to McSween (2003), the self-observation process involves answering
three questions: What’s my job, how am I doing, and what’s in it for me? To answer the
question of “what’s my job?”, each worker lists the actions that are needed to complete
the job safely. Then these actions are included in a checklist, and the worker selects yes,
no, or not applicable in reference to whether or not the action was performed. A
percentage safe number is then calculated to see “how I am doing”. This process makes
the employee more aware of his or her safe and unsafe actions. To answer the question,
“what’s in it for me?”, individuals need to feel that they can take control of their own
safety. The worker must be motivated to conduct self-observations, and this motivation
usually emerges from the desire to avoid injury. However, if motivation is low, training
in the benefits of self-observation can help get him or her started, and motivation will
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build as the worker begins to internalize the concepts (Krause et al., 1990). It is also
important to publicly congratulate individuals on their safety progress to keep them
involved. The worker then uses the observation data to develop a plan to improve
behaviors that do not meet his or her safety standards (Geller & Clarke, 1999). If
possible, safety antecedents such as posters or notes should be posted in the work area to
serve as reminders. Self-observations can be just as effective as peer observations. In a
study conducted by Krause et al (1990), a safety self-observation program was
implemented into a metropolitan transit authority. The drivers created an inventory of
safe behaviors, which they completed twice a day. Four months after implementation,
accident frequency decreased 66%.
Olson and Austin (2006) applied self-management BBS concepts to a highly
accident prone element in student flight training: landings. Many of these accidents are
the result of human error; tracking the causes of errors through behavioral processes can
help prevent an accident. It also has the added benefit of providing the means to
investigate patterns in errors and improve training through the evaluation of policies and
programs. Additionally, self-evaluation can help students develop safe habits and
attitudes. The instrument that was developed for this study collected information on
student pilot landings that included personal variables, environmental conditions, and a
rating scale of the landing quality. It was completed by both the instructor and student,
and provided valuable information that can be used to assist students and instructors
target errors, allow for the evaluation of teaching effectiveness, benchmark students
against peers, and help standardize the timing of solo and check rides (Olson & Austin,
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2006). This type of methodology can be applied to any area of flight training with the
goal of improving safety and instruction.

Summary
Human error has been cited in many aviation accidents, and while it may seem
natural to blame the pilot, there are many factors that were at work in the background.
Reason (1998) developed the Swiss Cheese model of accident causation that defines
these factors as organizational influences, unsafe supervision, precondition for unsafe
acts, and unsafe acts. Holes in these defenses can potentially align to lead to an accident.
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) expanded this concept to help accident investigators and
those in charge of safety programs determine exactly what those holes were. Their
HFACS model was developed from extensive analysis of accidents and can be used by
accident investigators to better define the causes of an accident; it can also inform
industry practice and identify hazards before an accident can occur (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 1997).
In most organizations, behavior contributes between 86% and 96% of all injuries
(McSween, 2003). It follows that targeting unsafe behavior and the environment that
causes it will help to decrease the amount of injuries in the workplace. This is the
premise of behavior-based safety (BBS). The BBS model is a proactive approach that
uses frequent measurement of behavior and problem solving (Olson & Austin, 2006). It
has been proven to be effective through scientifically-based studies, and in the majority
of cases, accident rates have been reduced by 60% to 90%.
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There are many potential benefits to BBS if it is implemented correctly, most
importantly, significant reductions in the occurrence of accidents. There are seven key
principles for successful implementation of BBS. These principles will help supervisors
develop a BBS program that will facilitate monitoring and changing behavior and
environmental influences while involving employees in the process. Although most
applications of BBS are in an environment that involves multiple employees, safety selfmanagement concepts can be implemented in the cockpit. Using safety self-evaluations
has the potential to increase safe behaviors through enhanced awareness of one’s actions.
Additionally, safety self-management can assist personnel in flight schools in identifying
common errors and improving instructional practices, which has the potential to address
latent hazards leading to proactive accident prevention.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Rationale
There are many factors related to an accident, making it an oversimplification of
the problem to just label the cause as pilot error, especially in an organizational setting
such as flight training. Latent and active failures can develop within an organization
(James T Reason, 1998), allowing it to gradually drift away from safety and closer to an
accident (Dekker, 2005). In general aviation, the pilot’s actions or inactions in response
to risks encountered in flight were responsible for 74% of non-fatal accidents and 70% of
fatal accidents in 2010 (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 2012). Midair collisions
were ranked as the ninth leading cause of fatalities in general aviation between 2001 and
2011 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012). A search of the NTSB aviation accident
database using the terms “midair collision” and accident revealed that there were 116
reports of midair collisions (MAC) between 2000 and 2012. These accidents resulted in
substantial aircraft damage and/or death in the United States. Each report represented
one of the aircraft involved, and further analysis yielded 60 instances of MACs involving
120 aircraft. Twenty-nine of these instances were fatal, resulting in 72 deaths (see Figure
3). Sixteen of the reports were aircraft on training flights, totaling 13 MAC incidents,
eight of which were fatal resulting in 20 deaths (see Figure 4).
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Figure 3. 2000-2012 U.S. Midair Collisions

Figure 4. 2000-2012 Midair Collisions Involving Instructional Flights
It is the responsibility of the pilot to see and avoid, which requires the pilot to be
vigilant during all phases of flight. During flight training, flight instructors should
encourage their students to use collision avoidance techniques and set a good example by
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complying with all regulations and accepted safety practices (Federal Aviation
Administration, 1983).
The purpose of this study, therefore, was to determine if the implementation of
behavior-based safety (BBS) into the flight training environment could effectively
improve the use of clearing turns prior to training maneuvers. In manufacturing, BBS is
a system that has been used to encourage safe behavior in employees, resulting in
significantly lower accident rates. It has been shown that within 3 to 5 years after
companies implement BBS, injury rates are reduced from 60% to 90% (Wilson, 2004).
Since BBS has been proven to be effective in a wide range of industries and settings, it is
possible that it may be used as a tool for encouraging safe behaviors in the flight training
environment.

Theoretical Framework
The overall goal of this research was to determine the effectiveness of BBS in a
flight training environment. The experimental design used was a pre-test, post-test
control group design. This research design would allow the effects of BBS to be more
clearly defined as the cause of the change in the number of clearing turns that were
performed. Additionally, the design offers several benefits according to Gall, Gall, and
Borg, (2007). The use of a pre-test with both the experimental and control groups allows
the researcher to establish that the two groups were approximately equal prior to
administering the treatment to the experimental group. Accordingly, the administration
of a post-test to both groups would suggest that any significant changes between the
experimental and the control groups could be attributed to BBS (Gall et al., 2007). In this
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study, the dependent variables were human factors areas and the utilization of clearing
turns; the independent variable was the BBS process, including observations and
feedback.
The participants in this study were flight instructors and students. The instructors
who volunteered to participate through completion of the pre-survey were assigned
randomly to either the control or experimental group. Since one instructor may have
several students, the group that the students were assigned was the same as the instructor
so that an instructor would not have students divided between the groups. This
minimized experimental treatment diffusion in which the instructor could unintentionally
give the treatment to students in the control group. The experimental group completed
training and treatment, several measurements of the treatment condition, and a postsurvey, while the control group completed several measurements of the untreated
condition, and a post-survey (see Table 1).
Table 1
Experimental Design
O1
O1
O1
R
X
Ocf
Oc
O2

R
R

X

Ocf
Oc

Ocf
Oc

Ocf
Oc

Ocf
Oc

O2
O2

= HFACS pre-survey
= Random assignment
= Training in BBS procedures and treatment for clearing turn use
= Observation checklist with feedback
= Observation checklist with no feedback
= HFACS post-survey
Gall et al. (2007) suggested several procedures to achieve control when using

experimental designs: frequent checks on the reliability of the experimenter’s
observations, frequent observation of the behaviors that have been targeted for change,
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and a detailed description of the procedures used to facilitate replication. For this study,
both the students and instructors in each group performed the role of experimenter. The
instructors in the experimental group administered the treatment of feedback on the
student’s performance of clearing turns as well as collecting data using the observation
checklist, while the instructors in the control group only collected data using the
observation checklist without providing feedback. The students in both groups had a dual
role, that of participant and experimenter. When the students were flying solo, they
conducted observations on themselves using the checklist at the completion of the flight
to collect data on their performance. Frequent checks of the experimenters’ observations
consisted of both the student and the instructor completing the observation checklist for
the same flight. Their observations were compared and checked for level of agreement.
Every flight, dual and solo, was encouraged to complete the observation checklist to
ensure frequent observations of the target behavior, consistently performing clearing
turns. The details of the procedures are described to allow for other researchers to
perform a similar experiment. Complying with all of these procedures helped maintain
treatment fidelity, which ensured that improvement in the use of clearing turns could be
attributed to the treatment and not differences in implementation (Gall et al., 2007).
The procedure used in BBS research has been outlined in several studies (Komaki
et al., 1978; Medina et al., 2009; Olson & Austin, 2001, 2006). The first step in
conducting BBS research is to identify the areas of safety concern through analysis of
incident reports, interviews, observations, and reviews of procedures manuals. Then,
training in BBS and desired safe behavior is provided to the employees; the observation
checklist is distributed afterwards. The data are analyzed and graphs are created on a
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regular basis using the observation data. They are displayed in a prominent place to
provide feedback on the participants’ progress before and after BBS.
In this study, clearing turn use was used as the area of safety concern based on
observations of the researcher. Then, the antecedents, or causes of the behavior, were
determined through a pre-survey created by the researcher using the Human Factors
Analysis Classification System (HFACS) Survey, which was administered to all
participants prior to beginning the study. Once the barriers to completing clearing turns
were identified, an intervention in the form of training was administered to the
experimental group. The instructors and students in the experimental group received
training to become effective observers as well as provide motivation for consistently
performing clearing turns. This training occurred through a recorded presentation.
Krause et al. (1990) identified 5 basic skills that the observers should gain from this
training:
1. How to see safe and unsafe behaviors
2. How to record what they observe – the scoring procedures
3. How to calculate % Safe
4. How to chart % Safe
5. How to provide feedback on what they observe (p. 168)
These basic skills provided the guidelines for the training session. The
participants were also briefed as to what constitutes correct execution of clearing turns.
The students in the program work one-on-one with their instructors in the aircraft. They
are accustomed to being observed and critiqued; therefore, the use of a checklist during
flight lessons was a concrete method to measure their improvement. In previous studies,
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the fact that the participants were being observed had some effect on the increase in safe
behaviors; however, over time, there was still a significant increase in safe behaviors.
After the training was completed, the observation checklist was distributed to the
participants, which focused on the target behavior of clearing turns. The observers were
students and instructors who used the checklist to record safe and unsafe behaviors
exhibited by the participants. Those data were compiled into a percent safe for the group
and this information was distributed to the participants in the experimental group as
feedback. One study created a safety newsletter and a website devoted to the plant’s
safety progress (Medina et al., 2009). This study incorporated a newsletter delivered by
e-mail to inform students as to how they are doing in relation to the group, which had the
potential to motivate under-performing students to improve (Matsui, Kakuyama, &
Onglatco, 1987). A study conducted by Erez (1977) found that when students were given
feedback on their past performance and used it to set future goals, they performed better
than students who did not receive feedback and set random goals. Another study found
that college students who received feedback on their performance as well as the group’s
performance tended to work harder if their performance fell short of the groups’ overall
performance (Matsui et al., 1987). Additionally, the goals set by each group member
were higher than the goals set by the individual, and while the group members exceeded
their personal goals, individuals were satisfied with simply achieving their goals. In
addition to the newsletter, feedback was also provided by the instructors after every flight
to reinforce safe behaviors in the form of rewards or verbal congratulations.
A survey was developed by the researcher using the HFACS framework to
address the first research question concerning the factors that were causing the
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differences between procedures and practices related to clearing turns (see Appendices A
and B). Prior to beginning the study, all participants were asked to complete the HFACS
survey. This assisted to determine those areas that need to be addressed during the study.
At the conclusion of the study, all the participants completed the same survey to
determine if there was improvement in these areas. The independent variable was the
implementation of BBS procedures, and the dependent variable was human factors areas.
Data were collected for the second question related to changes in the quantity of
clearing turns using a BBS checklist that was completed by instructors and students. The
BBS checklists (see Appendix C) were used to provide daily individual feedback to the
students to ensure that they could be apprised of progress towards improving their use of
clearing turns, an important aspect of successful BBS programs. These data were
collected on every dual and solo flight for six weeks. The independent variable was the
implementation of BBS processes, and the dependent variable was the number of clearing
turns completed as determined by the observer checklist. The percent safe, which is
calculated by taking the number of safe observations divided by the total number of
observations, was evaluated over time to determine if BBS had a positive effect on the
use of clearing turns.

Population and Sample
The target population for this study was students enrolled in a four year, collegiate
Part 141 professional flight training program. The graduates of this type of program
typically pursue a career as an airline or corporate pilot, and normally earn their private
and commercial certificates during the first two years of instruction. Many also earn their
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flight instructor certificate. The typical age range of the students was 18-22. The sample
for this study was students enrolled in a Midwestern collegiate professional flight
program. All students were invited to participate in the study as it had a direct impact on
their overall safety, and resulted in the maximum number of participants. The number of
students enrolled in the first two years of the flight program was approximately149, and
consisted of freshmen and sophomores. Invitations to participate in the research study
were distributed to 43 part-time and 3 full-time instructors. The participants were then
assigned randomly to either the control or experimental group using a random number
generator, resulting in seven instructors in the control group and six instructors in the
experimental group. See Table 2 for the details. The minimum requirement to take the
survey was to possess a certified flight instructor certificate (CFI), which was satisfied by
all the participants. Both groups had fairly equal numbers of instructors who possessed a
certified flight instructor instrument rating (CFII), multi-engine instructor rating (MEI),
and advanced ground instructor certificate (AGI). There was a slightly higher number of
instructors who possessed an instrument ground instructor certificate (IGI) in the
experimental group than the control group. As far as total flight time, the experimental
group had more flight experience than the control group participants with the majority of
the instructors having a total flight time of 501-1000 hours; whereas, the control group
was distributed more evenly among the lower flight times. The number of hours of
instruction given was fairly similar in distribution between the two groups, with the
control group having a slightly higher average. The demographics of the groups were not
changed significantly from the pre-survey.
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Table 2
Instructor Demographics
Pre-Survey
Cont.
(n = 7)
N
%

Exp.
(n = 6)
N
%

Post-Survey
Cont.
Exp.
(n = 7)
(n = 5)
N
%
N
%

CFI
CFII
MEI
AGI
IGI

7
3
2
1
1

100.0
42.9
28.6
14.3
14.3

6
4
1
1
3

100.0
66.7
16.7
16.7
50.0

7
3
2
1
1

100.0
42.9
28.6
14.3
14.3

5
4
1
1
2

100.0
80.0
20.0
20.0
40.0

Total flight time
(hours)
200-250
251-500
501-1000
1000+

1
2
2
1

14.3
28.6
28.6
14.3

0
1
5
0

0.0
16.7
83.3
0.0

1
2
2
1

14.3
28.6
28.6
14.3

1
3
1

20.0
60.0
20.0

1
2
0
2
1
1

14.3
28.6
0
28.6
14.3
14.3

1
0
2
2
1
0

16.7
0.0
33.3
33.3
16.7
0.0

1
2
0
2
1
1

14.3
28.6
0
28.6
14.3
14.3

1
0
1
2
1
0

20.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
20.0
0.0

Part-time
Full-time

5
2

71.4
28.6

5
1

83.3
16.7

5
2

71.4
28.6

4
1

80.0
20.0

18-21
22-25
26 +

2
4
1

28.6
57.1
14.3

2
4
0

33.3
66.7
0.0

2
4
1

28.6
57.1
14.3

1
4
0

20.0
80.0
0.0

Male
Female

6
1

85.7
14.3

5
1

83.3
16.7

6
1

85.7
14.3

4
1

80.0
20.0

Demographic
Flight instructor
certificates held

Flight instruction
given (Hours)
0-40
41-100
101-200
201-500
501-1000
1000+
Employment

Age

Gender

43
For the student portion of the study, invitations to participate in the research study
were distributed to 149 students who were enrolled in the Private Pilot, Commercial Pilot
I, Commercial Pilot II, and Instrument and Commercial flight courses. The participants
who agreed to participate in the study were then assigned to either the control or
experimental group based on the group that their instructor was assigned, resulting in 10
students in the control group and 16 in the experimental group. The control group had
generally fewer hours of flight experience than the experimental group. The
demographics and number of student participants in the control and experimental groups
are presented in Table 3, which includes the pre- and post-survey and the observation
checklists.
The flight program’s basic training fleet consisted of 16 Cirrus SR-20 aircraft; 13
of which were GS models used for primary training, while the remaining three were GTS
models that were used mainly for instrument training; however, they could be used for
primary training as well. The aircraft are flown for two types of lessons: dual, which has
an instructor and a student on board, and solo, with only the student on board. Each
lesson was approximately an hour and a half long with two to three lessons scheduled per
week.

Instrumentation
Two instruments were used to gather data: a pre- and post-survey concerning
human factors and an observation checklist. The human factors survey utilized portions
of Wiegmann and Shappell’s (2003) HFACS model to examine areas that could provide

Table 3
Student Demographics
Pre-Survey
Cont.
(n = 10)
N
%

Exp.
(n = 16)
N
%

Post-Survey
Cont.
Exp.
(n = 8)
(n = 8)
N
%
N
%

8
2
0
0

80.0
20.0
0.0
0.0

9
2
5
0

56.3
12.5
31.3
0.0

6
2
0
0

75.0
25.0
0.0
0.0

5
2
1
0

62.5
25.0
12.5
0.0

5
2
0
0

71.4
28.6
0
0.0

5
3
5
0

38.4
23.1
38.4
0.0

8
1
1
0

80.0
10.0
10.0
0.0

5
4
7
0

31.3
25.0
43.8
0.0

6
2
0
0

75.0
25.0
0.0
0.0

2
3
3
0

25.0
37.5
37.5
0.0

0
5
2
0

0
71.4
28.6
0.0

1
6
6
0

7.7
46.2
46.2
0.0

18-21
22-25
26 +

10
0
0

100.0
0.0
0.0

15
1
0

93.8
6.3
0.0

8
0
0

100.0
0.0
0.0

8
0
0

100.0
0.0
0.0

7
0
0

100.0
0.0
0.0

12
1
0

92.3
7.7
0.0

Male
Female

9
1

90.0
10.0

12
4

75.0
25.0

7
1

87.5
12.5

5
3

62.5
37.5

7
0

100.0
0.0

10
3

76.9
23.1

Demographic
Flight course
Private Pilot
Commercial Pilot I
Commercial Pilot II
Instrument and
Commercial
Total Flight Time
(Hours)
0-40
41-100
101-200
201+

Observation Checklist
Cont.
Exp.
(n = 7)
(n = 13)
N
%
N
%

Age

Gender
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answers to the question: Which human factors are causing the discrepancies between
procedures and practice with respect to clearing turns, and can these discrepancies be
reduced through BBS? Dekker (2005) stated that determining the discrepancy between
procedure and practice is crucial to improving the safety of an organization. The
HFACS survey (see Appendices A and B) was developed by the researcher and was
evaluated by peers within the flight training program to determine its validity. Internal
consistency reliability was estimated for items 1 and 3-9 of the pre-survey using
Chronbach’s Coefficient Alpha and SPSS software. The student survey yielded an alpha
of .82 for 8 items and 26 participants, and the instructor survey had an alpha of .54 for 8
items and 13 participants. In general, an alpha between .70 and .80 is adequate for newly
developed instruments and basic research (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The instructor
survey reliability was relatively low due to the small number of items and participants.
The survey was distributed to the students and instructors in the flight program before
and after the study through online Qualtrics survey software. The information provided
on the pre-survey specified the areas that needed to be targeted in the training session as
part of the implementation of BBS, while the post-survey helped determine if there was
improvement in these areas as a result of BBS. The HFACS survey focused specifically
on the areas of organizational influences (resource management, organizational climate,
and organizational process), unsafe supervision (inadequate supervision, planned
inappropriate operations, failure to correct problem, and supervisory violations),
preconditions for unsafe acts (physical environment, technological environment, adverse
mental states, crew resource management), and unsafe acts (skill-based errors, decision
errors, and routine violations) (see Figure 5). These areas were selected based on the
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researcher’s experience with the problem of the study: students’ failure to perform
clearing turns. The areas that were excluded (adverse psychological states, physical and
mental limitations, personnel readiness, perceptual errors, and exceptional violations)
were not applicable to the nature of the problem. The relationship of each survey item to
its corresponding HFACS category is illustrated in Table 4. The descriptions of the
categories were derived from examples provided by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003). The
data collected from the survey included quantitative and qualitative data. The
quantitative data produced means and standard deviations for further analysis. The
qualitative data gathered from the open-ended question were coded and analyzed.
Of the 46 instructors, 14 agreed to participate; however, only 13 instructors
actually completed the pre-survey (28% completion rate). The pre-survey was distributed
to 149 students, and was completed by 26 students (17% completion rate). The 13
instructors who completed the pre-survey were sent the link for the post- survey, and all
but one instructor completed the post-survey for an n of 12 (92% completion rate). All of
the students who completed the pre-survey received a link to complete the post-survey
regardless of whether they submitted any observation checklists. Students who did not
complete the pre-survey, but who completed at least one observation checklist were also
invited to complete the post-survey; however, none of these students did so. The total
number of students who received the survey link was 36, of which 16 completed the postsurvey (44%), with eight from the control group and eight from the experimental group.
Student participation decreased 20% for the control group and 50% for the experimental
group between the pre- and post-surveys.
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Figure 5. HFACS Categories Included in the HFACS Survey
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Table 4
Relationship of HFACS Survey Items to HFACS Categories
Pre-survey Item
1. How often do you do
clearing turns?
2. What are some of the
reasons you don’t do
clearing turns?
 I forget.

HFACS Category Description
Routine violations Not performing clearing turns is
accepted practice
NA
NA



Supervisory
violations
Organizational
process







My instructor told me
not to.
They take time away
from getting the lesson
done.
They are not part of the
procedures for the
maneuver.
The traffic system will
alert me to other aircraft
in the area.
The chances of me
hitting another plane are
slim.
They are not important.

3. My instructor makes sure
that I complete clearing
turns before beginning a
maneuver.
4. My instructor corrects me
if I do not complete a
clearing turn before a
maneuver.
5. My instructor does not
think clearing turns are
important.
6. When I try to do a
clearing turn, my instructor
discourages it.

Skill-based errors

Decision errors

Omitting steps in a procedure,
negative habit
Violated established procedures
Requirements to complete all the
maneuvers in a flight period (quotas),
time pressure
Inadequate knowledge of existing
procedures

Technological
environment

Reliance on a system with
limitations, complacency

Adverse mental
state

Complacency, overconfidence

Organizational
climate
Inadequate
supervision

Norms and rules, values, beliefs, and
attitudes
Failure to provide proper training,
guidance

Failure to correct
problem

Failure to correct a safety hazard,
failure to initiate corrective action

Organizational
climate

Norms and rules, values, beliefs, and
attitudes

Crew resource
management

Interactions with instructor affecting
students’ actions
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7. There are too many
maneuvers in a lesson to do
clearing turns and complete.
the lesson
8. It is acceptable to not do
a clearing turn if the lesson
can be completed.
9. I am less likely to do a
clearing turn if the weather
is nice.
10. The FAA provides
specific guidance on how to
conduct a clearing turn
(how much heading change,
amount of bank, etc.)
11. The flight department
provides specific guidance
on how to conduct a
clearing turn (how much
heading change, amount of
bank, etc.)

Planned
inappropriate
operations

Program managers overloading
students with tasks

Resource
management

Production is valued over safety

Physical
environment

Weather conditions encouraging
complacency

Organizational
process

Procedures created by the Federal
Aviation Administration that provide
guidance to the students and
instructors

Organizational
process

Procedures created by the flight
department that provide guidance to
the students and instructors

The observation checklist was used to collect quantitative data regarding the
proper use of clearing turns to answer the first research question: Is there a significant
increase in the utilization of clearing turns prior to initiating training maneuvers by
students in the flight program when BBS is implemented into flight training? According
to Krause et al. (1990), there are several steps involved in developing the checklist used
by the observer. The first step is to identify critical safety-related behaviors. This can be
accomplished through analysis of incident reports, interviews with workers, worker
observations, and reviews of procedures manuals. In this study, the HFACS survey
provided this information. Next, the safety-related behaviors must be clearly defined in
terms of what constitutes safe performance of a task. A clear standard of safe
performance will increase the reliability of the observations since the observers will know
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exactly what is considered safe and unsafe behavior. While the FAA has specified when
to complete a clearing turn in various publications (Federal Aviation Administration,
1983, 2003, 2014), there are no specific criteria provided regarding how to perform a
clearing turn (degrees of heading change, bank, etc.), nor does the flight program
involved in this study provide guidance, only that it must be completed prior to beginning
all maneuvers. Therefore, a performance objective for clearing turns was created that
was clear, measurable, and repeatable (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008). It
included a description of exactly how many degrees of heading change and in what
direction to turn when completing clearing turns. Once this was complete, the final step
was to prepare an observation checklist for use by the observers.
It is important to use positive terminology in the checklist (Krause et al., 1990;
Loafmann, 1998; McSween, 2003). The checklist should focus on the number of safe
practices and avoid negative terms such as unsafe. This helps to ensure that everyone is
clear with respect to those safe practices that are targeted, and employees become more
inclined to accept the program rather than the traditional negative approach. Once the
checklist is complete, it should be reviewed by all employees for accuracy, completeness,
and clarity before it is implemented by the observation team.
This checklist was used by the participants in the experimental and control groups
to record the safe practices that occurred during flight. It was comprised of the desired
safe practice, which is clearing turn use, and columns for marking safe practices,
concerns, and comments (see Appendices C and D). The percentage of safe behaviors
was then calculated by dividing the number of safe observations by the total number of
observations. Several blanks were provided in the checklist to allow students and
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instructors sufficient space to add any additional behaviors that they would like to
improve, independent of the research questions. During data collection, students were
observed by their instructors on dual flights or through self-observation on solo flights,
and the student’s use of clearing turns were recorded on the observation checklist. When
the student completed a clearing turn prior to initiating a maneuver, it was marked in the
“Number Safe” column, and failure to complete a clearing turn prior to starting a
maneuver was marked in the “Number of Concerns” column. If the student forgot
initially to perform a clearing turn, but then stopped before completing the next step in
the procedure to perform the clearing turn, it was marked in the safe column. If the
student had to be reminded to complete a clearing turn prior to completing the next step
in the procedure, it was marked in the concern column. After each flight, the students in
the experimental group received feedback on their individual performance through the
calculation of their percent safe observations. They also received weekly feedback on
their progress as a group through e-mail updates. This encouragement was to serve as the
consequence for reinforcing the use of clearing turns. The intrinsic reward of
experiencing improvement could lead to further efforts to use clearing turns. The
effectiveness of BBS was evaluated through a visual analysis of the group’s change in
cumulative percent safe score over the course of the study to determine if there was a
significant increase. The experimental group’s percent safe was also compared to the
control group to determine if BBS was related to the increase in clearing turn use, or if
other factors or variables were affecting outcomes.
Observation checklists were provided to all the students of the instructors who
participated in the pre-survey regardless of whether or not the student completed the pre-
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survey. For the experimental group, 21 students received checklists, 13 of which
submitted data for at least one flight for a response rate of 62%. There were 12 students
in the control group who received checklists, and seven provided at least one observation
for a response rate of 54%. The observation period lasted 40 days, and data were
recorded on 19 of those days. The experimental group completed approximately 94
training flights over the research period, and submitted 19 observation checklists (20%),
and the control group flew 43 times and submitted 20 observation checklists (47%). The
average number of flights per student was 7.2 for the experimental group and 6.1 for the
control group. The average number of observation checklists submitted was 1.5 for the
experimental group and 2.9 for the control group. For solo flights, none of the students in
the experimental group completed observations while the students in the control group
submitted nine observations. For dual flights, the instructors submitted 10 observations
for the experimental group and five for the control group; observations were completed
by both the instructor and student for six experimental group and four control group dual
flights. There were five observations that did not denote who completed the observation
checklist, three for the experimental group and two for the control group.

Data Collection
The data were collected through two sources: a pre- and post-survey concerning
human factors and observation checklists (see Appendices A, B, C and D). With respect
to the ABC’s of BBS, the surveys examined the antecedents to the behavior being
observed, while the observation checklists served as the consequences to change the
behavior. Each student and instructor was assigned a unique number which was used on
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both instruments to facilitate tracking and comparison and allow for confidentiality of the
participants. The HFACS surveys were used to find potential weaknesses in the system
that may need to be addressed by BBS. They also provided information on whether BBS
reduced the gap between procedure and practice. The surveys were distributed through
the Qualtrics web-based survey software to the control and experimental groups. The
participants were contacted through an e-mail message that included a cover letter with a
link to the survey (see Appendices E and F). The cover letter emphasized the importance
of the study to encourage responses, and requested that the participants complete the
survey by the deadline date. If the survey was not completed within the specified time
frame, a follow-up e-mail was sent.
The BBS observer checklist (see Appendix C) was used by the instructors and
students of the experimental group to facilitate daily feedback, or if the students were on
a solo flight, they completed the checklist after their flight to evaluate their performance.
Daily feedback is critical to the effectiveness of BBS since it aids in identifying obstacles
to safe behaviors and assists in developing and reinforcing safe behaviors (Loafmann,
1997). These data were collected on each dual and solo flight for six weeks. The
instructors and students in the control group completed a checklist that simply recorded
the number of clearing turns without using it for feedback (see Appendix D).
There were some limitations to the data collection plan. According to Ary,
Jacobs, and Sorensen (2010), a potential problem of internal validity is experimenter
effects. In previous studies of BBS, the fact that the subjects were being observed had
some effect on the increase in safe behaviors; however, over time, there was still a
significant increase in safe behaviors. Additionally, since the students in the program
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work one-on-one with their instructors in the aircraft, they were accustomed to being
observed and critiqued. Therefore, the use of a checklist during flight lessons was a
concrete method to measure their improvement. The self-observations conducted by the
students could be subject to bias; although, there was emerging research that indicated
that this was an effective strategy for promoting safety for employees who are working
alone (Olson & Austin, 2006). Another factor that could impact internal validity is
testing (Gall et al., 2007). It is possible that the pre-survey could affect the results of both
the post-survey and observation checklists. The data collected from the surveys were
also subject to issues with self-reporting of clearing turn improvement; however, some of
the inaccuracies should have been eliminated by the daily feedback on the correct use of
clearing turns from the observation checklists. There was also the possibility that there
were responses perceived to be socially acceptable. Since the survey was voluntary, it
was assumed that those who participated in the survey were similar to those who chose
not to participate. Further, the online data collection methods for the survey may have
produced low response rates.

Data Analysis
The data collected from the surveys were analyzed with SPSS software to provide
percentages, means, and standard deviations. Two types of statistical significance tests
were performed on the pre-and post-survey data for each group: an unpaired, two tailed
t-test and Fisher’s exact test. These tests were performed at a 95% confidence interval
with significance at the p < .05 level. The unpaired t-test was chosen because pairing
individual responses was inhibited by high non-response rates on the post-survey in the
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experimental student group, which would have necessitated discarding a large part of the
data. Prior to conducting the t-test, the data were examined for normality and equality of
variances (Gall et al., 2007). The data were found to be normally distributed through
analysis of the QQ Plots and histograms. The equality of variances (or homogeneity) was
determined through Levene’s Test in SPSS, and all items produced a p-value of greater
than .05 (i.e. equal variances) with the exception of Item 6 for the student control group’s
pre- and post-survey comparison. This item had a variance p-value of .000, indicating
that the variances were not equal; therefore, the t-test p-value was adjusted accordingly
through SPSS.
Due to the large percentage of missing data from the experimental group on the
post survey, an attempt was made to adjust for the non-response bias that could impact
the study’s results through a procedure suggested by Miller and Smith (1983). A
comparison of the characteristics of the respondents to the non-respondents was made to
determine if the two groups were similar, and if so, it could be assumed that those who
did not respond would have given the same responses as those who did complete the
post-survey. After examining various aspects of the two groups, it was determined that
they were dissimilar; therefore, bias may have been introduced into the survey results,
which could limit their generalizability.
For the survey, a t-test was performed on items 1,3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 which
allowed for the comparison of means between the two groups to determine if there was a
significant difference between pre- and post-survey data (Gall et al., 2007). Items 5, 6, 7,
8, and 9 were negatively worded items, and their values were reverse coded to allow the
human factors to be ranked to answer the first part of Research Question 1. For items 2,
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10, and 11, which involved proportions, Fisher’s exact test was performed to determine
the p-values. This test is generally used when the sample sizes are small, as was the case
with this study. The program used for Fisher’s exact test was R, a statistical
programming language. The results of both tests were then described further through
written interpretation. The responses to the open-ended question were categorized and
coded before being evaluated and interpreted.
The observation checklist was used to determine if there was an increase in the
use of clearing turns. The percentage of safe behaviors was calculated by dividing the
number of clearing turns performed by the total number of observations (i.e., maneuvers)
for each lesson that data were collected. The cumulative percentage of safe behaviors
was calculated for each day, graphically depicted, and examined visually to determine if
there was a change in the number of clearing turns that were performed, as the small
number of data points prohibited statistical analysis. The effectiveness of the BBS
program was determined, accordingly.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings from the pre- and post-survey and observation
checklists. The data from the pre-survey were used to answer the first part of the
research question related to which human factors are causing the discrepancies between
procedures and practice with respect to clearing turns. The data from the pre- and postsurvey were used to answer the research question related to determining if those
discrepancies were reduced through the implementation of BBS. The means of the preand post-survey were evaluated at the p < .05 level of significance. The final research
question as to whether or not there was a significant increase in the utilization of clearing
turns prior to initiating training maneuvers by students in the flight program after the
implementation of BBS was answered by the observation checklist. The Likert responses
for items 5, 7, 8, and 9 were 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Undecided, 4 =
Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree. For the items that involved the frequency that a
particular event occurred (items 1, 3, 4, and 6), the responses were coded as 1 = Never, 2
= Rarely, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Most of the Time, and 5 = Always. The means of the
control and experimental groups were also examined to determine if there were any
significant differences (p < .05) between the two groups at the beginning and conclusion
of the study.
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For the observation checklists, the daily percent safe was calculated for each
group by taking the number of clearing turns completed by each student per day divided
by the number of maneuvers or observations that were taken on that day. The cumulative
percent safe was calculated for each date by dividing the total number of clearing turns
by the total number of observations up to that date. This section examines the findings of
the pre-survey, post-survey, and observation checklists in relation to their respective
research questions; see Table 7 for a summary of the results for both surveys.
Research Question 1, part 1: Which human factors are causing the discrepancies between
procedures and practice with respect to clearing turns?
The combined results of the HFACS pre-survey for the instructor (n = 13) and
student groups (n = 26) were examined for this research question (see Tables 5 and 6).
The pre-survey indicated that there were several human factors that interfered with
clearing turn use. For the instructors, planned inappropriate operations was the first
ranked reason clearing turns were not being completed (M = 2.92, SD 1.04), indicating
that instructors believed that there were too many maneuvers in a lesson to perform both
clearing turns and maneuvers within a single flight period. The second ranked factor was
routine violations (M = 3.62, SD = .51), which assumed that not performing clearing
turns is an accepted practice, and was evident in that students were performing clearing
turns from sometimes to most of the time. The third ranked factors included failure to
correct problem, where the instructors did not correct their students if they did not
perform clearing turns (M = 3.62, SD = 1.03), and resource management, which involves
completing the lesson within a specified time frame (M = 3.62, SD = .95).
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Table 5
Instructor Pre-survey Ranking of Human Factors

Item #
7
1
4
8
3
5
9
6

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.8
2.5
2.4
2.6
2.7

Ranking
1
2
3
3
4
5
6
7

Human factor
Planned inappropriate operations
Routine violations
Failure to correct problem
Resource management
Inadequate supervision
Organizational climate
Physical environment
Crew resource management

Mean
2.92
3.62
3.69
3.69
4.00
4.08
4.38
4.69

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Skill-based errors
Supervisory violations
Organizational process
Other
Technological environment
Decision errors
Adverse mental state
Organizational climate

%
69.2
61.5
46.2
23.1
7.7
0
0
0

1
2
2

FAA organizational process
Yes
No
Not sure

38.5
30.8
30.8

1
2
2

Flight program organizational process
No
Yes
Not sure

69.2
15.4
15.4

10

11

SD
1.04
0.51
1.03
0.95
0.71
0.86
0.51
0.48

On the student pre-survey, the number one factors of concern were planned
inappropriate operations (M = 3.46, SD = .99), where program managers are overloading
students with tasks, and resource management (M = 3.46, SD = 1.03), where production
is valued over safety. All the participants believed that there were too many maneuvers
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Table 6
Student Pre-survey Ranking of Human Factors
Item #
7
8
9
1
4
3
5
6

2.1
2.2
2.5
2.3
2.8
2.4
2.6
2.7

Ranking
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Human factor
Planned inappropriate operations
Resource management
Physical environment
Routine violations
Failure to correct problem
Inadequate supervision
Organizational climate
Crew resource management

Mean
3.46
3.46
3.58
3.85
4.00
4.04
4.19
4.92

1
2
3
4
4
5
5
6

Skill-based errors
Supervisory violations
Technological environment
Organizational process
Other
Decision errors
Adverse mental state
Organizational climate

%
65.4
26.9
19.2
15.4
15.4
3.8
3.8
0

1
2
3

FAA organizational process
Not sure
Yes
No

61.5
30.8
7.7

1
2
3

Flight program organizational process
Yes
Not sure
No

57.7
38.5
3.8

10

11

SD
0.99
1.03
0.95
0.61
1.06
0.77
1.02
0.27

to complete a lesson and were willing to omit clearing turns so that the lesson could be
completed. The third ranked factor was the physical environment (M = 3.58, SD = .95),
indicating that the students were more likely to omit a clearing turn if the weather was
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such that traffic would be easier to see. The fourth ranked factor was routine violations
with a mean of 3.85 and SD of .61, where not doing clearing turns is accepted practice.
The factor organizational process involved procedures created by the FAA and
the flight program that provide guidance to students and instructors regarding how to
perform a clearing turn. Although there are no set procedures regarding how to perform a
clearing turn by either organization, the majority of instructors and students responded
“yes” and “not sure” with the exception of the students’ responses for flight program
organizational process, where the majority of the students responded “no”. This means
that this factor is an area of concern as the majority of instructors and students assumed
there were procedures in place when there were not, or were uncertain as to whether or
not there was a procedure.
Item 2 on the pre-survey had participants choose those factors that were reasons
clearing turns were not completed. The HFACS category skill-based errors, which
involve omitting steps in a procedure and negative habits, had the largest percentage of
responses for both students and instructors at 65.4% and 69.2%, respectively. The
students were generally more likely to forget or omit the first step of the procedures,
clearing turn, than all of the other factors in this item. Supervisory violations, which are
a violation of established procedures, were the second most selected item for the students
(26.9%) and instructors (61.5%). The instructors were highly likely to tell their students
not to perform a clearing turn, despite the fact that it was part of the flight program’s
procedures to do so. The effects of organizational processes, which involve requirements
to complete all the maneuvers in a flight period (quotas) and time pressure, was the third
most selected item for the instructors (46.2%), and the fourth most selected item for the
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students (15.4%). This suggests that there was pressure apparent to get the maneuvers
completed in one flight period, so clearing turns were omitted to achieve this goal. For
the students, the technological environment, or relying on the traffic system in the aircraft
was ranked third (19.2%), even though it had limitations.
For the open-ended item labeled “other, please describe” in Item 2, three
instructors provided written responses. The responses included:
1. “If they have just done a maneuver with significant heading change and are
looking outside properly, we should have seen the traffic already.”
2. “Sometimes during the previous maneuver we clear the area. For example, after
steep turns I will go into the stall. This helps efficiency. However, I probably
should do them every time.”
3. “If we are doing stalls, I usually won’t have them do a clearing turn between each
individual stall since our heading hasn’t changed for the most part.”
The common theme with these responses was that sometimes a maneuver was substituted
for a clearing turn, even though the two are not interchangeable. This is a type of
procedural error, which is when the pilot applies a procedure that is not appropriate for
the situation. It is also related to organizational process, since the procedure for
conducting a clearing turn is not defined by the flight program, the pilots developed an
alternate procedure for the situation. With respect to the student survey, four students
provided responses to “other, please describe”. Their statements included:
1. “I feel that the area is already clear.”
2. “There haven’t been any planes around us.”
3. “We checked the area visually.”
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4. “I do clearing turns every time.”
The first two responses involve an adverse mental state, which is comprised of
complacency and overconfidence. Similar to the instructors, the third response is related
to procedural error and organizational process. The last response was written since there
was no option for students who always do clearing turns.
Research Question 1, Part 2: Are the discrepancies reduced through the implementation
of BBS?
This part of the research question was answered through analyzing the pre- and
post-survey responses. It was determined that there was no significant change (p < .05)
for the instructors and students, either positive or negative, between the means of the preand post-survey responses for all items (see Table 7). P-values were also calculated
comparing the responses of the control and experimental groups for each survey and were
evaluated at the p < .05 level of significance. The groups were largely equivalent at the
beginning and end of the study except for two items. For the instructors, item four,
which concerned the HFACS area of failure to correct problem, was the only test that was
significant, t(10) = 3.54, d = 2.07, 95% CI [.63, 2.75], when comparing the post-surveys
of the control and experimental instructors (p = .005). The experimental group instructors
were less likely to correct their students if they forgot to perform a clearing turn after
receiving BBS training than the control group instructors who received no training. For
the students, the choice “I forget” on item 2 was significant (p = .046, 95% CI [.02,
1.21]), on the pre-survey, possibly indicating that the students in the experimental group
were more likely to forget clearing turns than the students in the control group prior to
treatment; however, this difference diminished on the post-survey (p = .569).

Table 7
Aggregate Survey Results
Instructors
Cont. Exp.
p
1. How often do (does) you (your student) do a clearing turn before a
maneuver? [Routine violations]
Pre-Survey
M 3.57
3.67
(SD) (.535) (.516)
Post-Survey
M 4.14
3.40
(SD) (.690) (.548)
p .109
.428

.751
.074

Students
Cont. Exp.
p

3.80
3.88
(.422) (.719)
3.88
4.00
(.835) (.756)
.807
.697

.768
.758

42.9
71.4
.592

100.0
100.0
1.0

.070
.470

40.0
87.5
.066

81.3
62.5
.362

.046
.569

•My instructor (I) told me (them) not to. [Supervisory violations]
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

57.1
57.1
1.0

66.7
60.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

30.0
37.5
1.0

25.0
12.5
.631

1.0
.569

•They take time away from getting the lesson done.
[Organizational process]
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

28.6
28.6
1.0

66.7
80.0
1.0

.242
.286

10.0
0.0
1.0

18.8
25.0
1.0

1.0
.467
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2. What are some of the reasons that you (your student) don’t (doesn’t)
do clearing turns?
•I (they) forget. [Skill-based errors]
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

Instructors
Cont. Exp.
p

Students
Cont. Exp.
p

•They are not part of the procedures for the maneuver [Decision
errors]
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

0.0
0.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

10.0
12.5
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

•The traffic system will alert me (us) to other aircraft in the area.
[Technological environment]
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

14.3
0.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

10.0
12.5
1.0

25.0
0.0
.262

.617
1.0

•The chances of me (us) hitting another plane are slim.
[Adverse mental state]
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

0.0
0.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

6.3
12.5
1.0

1.0
1.0

•They are not important [Organizational climate]
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

0.0
0.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

0.0
0.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

•Other
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

28.6
14.3
NA

16.7
0.0
NA

NA
NA

30.0
12.5
NA

6.3
0.0
NA

NA
NA
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Instructors
Cont. Exp.
p
3. My instructor (I) makes sure that I (my student) complete(s) clearing
turns before beginning a maneuver. [Inadequate supervision]
Pre-Survey
M 4.00
4.00
(SD) (.816) (.632)
Post-Survey
M 4.00
3.60
(SD) (.577) (.548)
p 1.00
.297
4. My instructor (I) corrects me (my student) if I (he/she) do (does) not
complete a clearing turn before a maneuver. [Failure to correct
problem]
Pre-Survey
M 3.86
3.50
(SD) (.690) (1.38)
Post-Survey
M 4.29
2.60
(SD) (.488) (1.14)
p .205
.275
5. My instructor (I) does (do) not think clearing turns are important.
[Organizational climate]
Pre-Survey
M 2.00
1.83
(SD) (.577) (1.17)
Post-Survey
M 1.57
1.60
(SD) (.535) (.548)
p .175
.693

1.00
.255

.557
.005

.744
.930

Students
Cont. Exp.
p

3.90
4.13
(.738) (.806)
3.88
3.88
(1.25) (.835)
.958
.486

.482

4.00
4.00
(1.25) (.966)
3.88
4.13
(1.36) (.835)
.841
.758

1.00

1.60
1.94
(.699) (1.81)
2.13
1.75
(1.25) (1.39)
.274
.733

.423

1.00

.664

.579
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Instructors
Cont. Exp.
p
6. When I (my student) try (tries) to do a clearing turn, my instructor (I)
discourages (discourage) it. [Crew resource management]
Pre-Survey
M 1.29
1.33
(SD) (.488) (.516)
Post-Survey
M 1.29
1.40
(SD) (.488) (.548)
p 1.00
.840
7. There are too many maneuvers in a lesson to do clearing turns and
complete the lesson. [Planned inappropriate operations]
Pre-Survey
M 3.14
3.00
(SD) (.900) (1.27)
Post-Survey
M 2.86
3.40
(SD) (1.06) (.548)
p .598
.530
8. It is acceptable to not do a clearing turn if the lesson can be
completed. [Resource management]
Pre-Survey
Post-Survey

M 2.29
2.33
(SD) (.756) (1.21)
M 3.00
3.20
(SD) (.816) (1.30)
p .115
.283

.867
.711

.817
.326

.933
.749

Students
Cont. Exp.
p

1.00
1.13
(.00) (.342)
1.25
1.25
(.463) (.707)
.170^ .561

.262

2.70
2.44
(.823) (1.09)
2.38
3.00
(.518) (1.31)
.346
.277

.521

2.70
2.44
(1.16) (.964)
2.25
2.50
(.707) (.926)
.351
.881

.538

1.00

.230

.554
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Instructors
Cont. Exp.
p
9. I am less likely to do (have my student do) a clearing turn if the
weather is nice. [Physical environment]
Pre-Survey
Post-Survey

M 1.71
1.50
(SD) (.488) (.548)
M 1.86
2.40
(SD) (.690) (1.14)
p .663
.119

.471
.326

Students
Cont. Exp.
p

2.80
2.19
(.919) (.911)
1.13
2.38
(.398) (.916)
.878
.640

.109
.346

10. The FAA provides specific guidance on how to conduct a clearing
turn. [Organizational process]
•Yes
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

42.9
28.6
1.0

33.3
20.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

30.0
62.5
.341

31.3
37.5
1.0

1.0
.619

•No
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

42.9
57.1
1.0

16.7
80.0
.080

.559
.578

10.0
25.0
.559

6.3
0.0
1.0

1.0
.466

•Not Sure
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

14.3
14.3
1.0

50.0
0.0
.182

.266
1.0

60.0
12.5
.066

62.5
62.5
1.0

1.0
.119
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Instructors
Cont. Exp.
p

Students
Cont. Exp.
p

11. The flight program provides specific guidance on how to conduct a
clearing turn. [Organizational process]
•Yes
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

28.6
28.6
1.0

0.0
20.0
.455

50.0
50.0
1.00

62.5
37.5
.391

.689
1.0

•No
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

71.4
57.1
1.0

66.7
40.0
.567

0.0
37.5
.069

6.3
25.0
.249

1.0
1.0

•Not Sure
Pre-Survey %
Post-Survey %
p

0.0
14.3
1.0

33.3
40.0
1.0

50.0
12.5
.152

31.3
37.5
1.0

.425
.569

Note. Boldface indicates a p-value that is significant at the p < .05 level. The ^ indicates a p-value that has been adjusted for
unequal variances.
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Research Question 2: Is there a significant increase in the utilization of clearing turns
prior to initiating training maneuvers by students in the flight program after BBS
implementation?
The results of the observation checklist are presented in Figure 6. The control
group performed a consistently higher percentage of clearing turns each day than the
experimental group. The cumulative percentages for each group remained fairly stable
over time with neither group improving or decreasing their clearing turn use during the
observation period. Aside from the first day of observations, the cumulative percentage
for each group did not vary much more than 5%. The control group completed clearing
turns on 70% to 75% of the maneuvers, while the experimental group was slightly lower
in clearing turn completion at 65% to 70%. The BBS neither positively nor negatively
affected clearing turn use prior to initiating training maneuvers.

Figure 6. Cumulative Percent of Clearing Turns Completed by Group
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The observation checklists included an area for comments. The comments from
the experimental group included: “both concerns were ground reference maneuvers”,
“used prior maneuvers as clearing turns, had limited time for all maneuvers”, “used steep
turn as a clearing turn”, “used a maneuver as a clearing turn”, and “not enough time in
slot/lesson to complete all turns”. The comments from the control group included: “no
clearing turns immediately after steep turns”, “we did steep turns twice, no clearing
turns”, “forgot twice – stopped maneuver and did turn before starting maneuver”, “did
clearing turns before all maneuvers”, and “not enough time in dual review lesson to do
clearing turns”. The general themes of the responses for the experimental group were:
1. Using a maneuver as a clearing turn (3)
2. Not enough time to perform clearing turns and maneuvers (2)
3. Not performing clearing turn before a specific type of maneuver (1)
For the control group, the general themes were:
1. Not performing a clearing turn before a specific type of maneuver (2)
2. Not enough time to perform clearing turns and maneuvers (1)
3. Forgetting (1)
4. Clearing turns completed before each maneuver (1)
These comments were all similar in nature to the findings from the HFACS surveys in
that procedural errors, organizational process, and skill-based errors were cited as reasons
for not completing clearing turns during a flight lesson.
In summary, this chapter examined the findings of the pre- and post-survey for
instructors and students, and the data from the observation checklists. It was determined
that there were several human factors areas that were interfering with clearing turn usage.
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Upon examining the HFACS survey, there were no significant changes in the responses
of the control and experimental groups when comparing the pre- and post-surveys. There
were some significant differences between the groups on a few items, namely the
instructor post-survey item 4 and the student pre-survey Item 2. The observation
checklists did not reveal any changes in the percentage of clearing turns completed for
either group in the study.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to determine if BBS could effectively motivate
students to complete a clearing turn prior to every training maneuver. The objectives of
this study, therefore, included: (1) Identify those human factors that cause the
discrepancies between procedures and practice with respect to clearing turns, and if those
discrepancies are reduced through the implementation of BBS and (2) Determine if there
is a significant increase in the frequency of clearing turns completed by students in the
flight program when BBS is implemented into flight training. The research questions that
were posited to achieve these objectives included: (1) Which human factors are causing
the discrepancies between procedures and practice with respect to clearing turns, and are
those discrepancies reduced through the implementation of BBS? and (2) Is there a
significant increase in the utilization of clearing turns prior to initiating training
maneuvers by students in the flight program after BBS implementation.

Conclusions
Midair collisions were the ninth leading cause of fatalities in general aviation
between 2001 and 2011 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012); failure to see and avoid
is the most commonly stated cause of these accidents. Although flight training accounts
for an eighth of the total flying in general aviation, nearly one-third of midair collisions
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occur during instructional flights (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 2010);
therefore, it is important that students and instructors adequately clear the area of traffic
to decrease the potential of a midair collision. However, according to the data gathered
in this study, clearing turns were omitted from sometimes to most of the time by the
participants, a fact that was also confirmed by the observation checklist, which revealed
that students were on average only completing clearing turns 70% of the time. The
findings from the pre-survey indicate that there are many human factors that could be
responsible for this occurrence.
The instructor pre-survey found those human factors that had the greatest impact
on clearing turn use were planned inappropriate actions and skill-based errors. The
instructors believed that it was difficult to complete both clearing turns and the
maneuvers in the lesson during one period The instructors also felt that they did not have
enough time to complete clearing turns, which is related to the fact that there were too
many maneuvers in each lesson. These are factors that must be rectified at the
organizational and supervisory level. This could have also lead to the instructors failing
to correct their students if they forgot to initiate a clearing turn and telling them not to
complete a clearing turn. The fact that students forget to initiate clearing turns may be
due to students who are new to flight training, and can potentially be improved by further
training and familiarization with the flight program’s procedures.
Similar human factors were found when examining the student responses to the
pre-survey. Like their instructors, the students believed that there were too many
maneuvers to complete in one flight period, and that there was pressure to complete the
lesson. They also noted that their instructor would tell them not to complete a clearing
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turn, presumably to make more time for maneuvers. These are related to organizational
influences and unsafe supervision. The students tended to forget to complete a clearing
turn, and were less likely to initiate a clearing turn when the weather was such that traffic
would be easier to see.
The observation checklists indicated that there was no improvement in clearing
turn use for the experimental group after the implementation of BBS, and clearing turn
use remained fairly stable over time for both groups. This may be due to several different
factors. The observations provided by both groups were low in number and sporadic
over the duration of the study. This could have led to difficulties in determining a trend,
and since consistent feedback is crucial to behavioral change, it could have also impacted
the effectiveness of BBS. Another possible reason for the lack of change is that the
policies established by the flight program (i.e. lesson requirements to complete a certain
number of maneuvers) may not have allowed for improvements in this area. Also, more
thorough training in BBS could have been provided to the experimental group to increase
the effectiveness of the training. Another factor that could have been involved was the
weather at the time of the study, which limited available training times and increased
pressure to complete the course before the end of the semester. It also limited the
opportunities to reinforce clearing turn behaviors. The participants may have also been
concerned with maximizing the amount of time spent practicing and perfecting
maneuvers since flight time is costly; therefore, they could have omitted clearing turns.
Lastly, there were several remarks on both the surveys and observation checklists that
indicated maneuvers were occasionally used in lieu of clearing turns. To alleviate this
human factor, the FAA and flight program should provide more guidance as to what
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constitutes a clearing turn and ensure that pilots are knowledgeable with respect to the
criteria.

Implications
This study has revealed several human factors areas that were preventing students
from performing clearing turns. It is also clear that while the FAA and flight program
suggest performing clearing turns prior to every maneuver, students and instructors are
not completing them 100% of the time. Accordingly, there are several implications for
policy, practice, and future research.
The human factors that were causing instructors and students to omit clearing
turns were primarily caused by the flight program’s policies that created pressure to
complete a lesson at the expense of clearing turns. This pressure was evident in
instructors telling students to omit clearing turns and placing lesson completion above
clearing turns. This would indicate that the flight program should review its flight
lessons and take steps to ensure that an environment is created that would allow time for
clearing turns.
With respect to implications for practice, flight training organizations should
closely examine the human factors that may be preventing the use of clearing turns. This
would allow for effective targeting of practices that would help alleviate these factors.
Instructors are an important key to ensuring good habits in their students, as evidenced by
the influence they exhibit on their student’s clearing turn use. Therefore, it is crucial that
instructors are properly guiding their students during flight training.
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There are also several implications for future research. While this study did not
show BBS to be effective in reducing human factors or increasing safe behavior
regarding clearing turns, additional research should be conducted within the flight
training environment to determine if it has the potential to do so when implemented
properly, consistently, and over a longer period of time. Another implication for research
is the use of HFACS as a way of identifying the human factors areas that need focus by
an organization to improve safety. While designed originally to provide systematic
procedures for analyzing accidents, the HFACS model was effective in identifying the
human factors that were causing pilots to omit clearing turns when used in a survey
format. Future research should focus on this use of HFACS.
In summary, students are not executing clearing turns to the level specified by the
FAA and flight program due to pressure to complete lessons in a timely manner. There is
a need to revisit each lesson to ensure that there is enough time to complete clearing turns
before every maneuver. This can help reduce the potential of a midair collision.

Recommendations
This study, like most studies, had some limitations. The population selected (i.e.
students in a four-year Part 141 training program within a large research institution) and
small sample size limit the generalizability of the results. There were also low
participation rates on the surveys and observation checklists, in addition to a high nonresponse rate of 50% for the students in the experimental group on the post-survey, all of
which may have affected the study’s findings and conclusions. However, there were
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some key recommendations for policy, practice, and future research that arose from this
study.
Recommendations for policy:
1. Flight training organizations and the FAA should clearly define what
constitutes a clearing turn so that there is no question as to which
procedure pilots should follow. This would also alleviate issues where
pilots use different procedures that do not technically meet the definition
of a clearing turn.
2. Adequate training in collision avoidance should be provided to flight
instructors so that they can model appropriate and safe habits and transfer
them to their students.
3. Flight training organizations should verify that the time needed to practice
the maneuvers in each flight lesson can be accomplished within a flight
period such that clearing turns are not compromised.
Recommendations for practice:
1. Flight training organizations should use the HFACS model in a proactive
manner to determine the factors that could cause unsafe behaviors. An
example of this type of practice could include distributing surveys to
instructors and students to determine the safety issues within an
organization.
2. Instructors should determine the reasons why their students are forgetting
clearing turns and develop strategies to remember them.
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Recommendations for future research:
1. Studies should be conducted over a longer period of time to determine the
broader effects of BBS since previous research has reported that the
benefits require time to be manifested. This study occurred during months
where the weather was not conducive to students flying routinely, and the
gaps between flight lessons could have resulted in BBS not being as
effective as it potentially could have been.
2. Ensure that the human factors that are related to policies established by the
training organization are eliminated prior to implementing BBS. Because
this was not accomplished, it was most likely difficult for students and
instructors to overcome these organizational influences to improve their
clearing turn use. This would allow BBS to be more effective in changing
the factors related to individual influences.
3. Due to the small sample size, it was difficult to determine statistically if
BBS had an effect on the antecedents and consequences of clearing turn
use; therefore, future research should attempt to increase the number of
participants and improve the response rates on the surveys and observation
checklists. The primary means of recruiting students and instructors for
their participation in this study was a food incentive. Perhaps including in
the recruitment materials a statement describing how the study will
directly benefit the participants in their development as a professional pilot
may have encouraged more participation. While this study did not do so,
it is important to follow-up with the students and instructors who did not
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complete the study through some form of interview to determine the
reasons why. This information can be used to create incentives that would
be effective in encouraging continued participation. Another method to
increase the sample size would be to collaborate with other flight training
organizations that have similar characteristics.
4. Since this was a longitudinal study, there were issues with attrition.
Future research should attempt to correct for non-response immediately
following the conclusion of the study. Additional reminders could be sent
to increase the survey response rate. If this is unsuccessful, Miller and
Smith (1983) offer several different ways to control for non-response error
that may be helpful to researchers, including comparing the respondents to
the population, respondents to non-respondents, early to late respondents,
and double-dipping non-respondents.
5. Implement a procedure that verifies that the participants actually watched
the training video. BBS is not effective when participants are not well
trained (DePasquale & Geller, 1999). It is also not effective when
implemented incorrectly. These could be reasons why there was no
significant change in the experimental group’s performance.
6. Different methods of recording clearing turn use should be explored in
future research, since self-reporting the number of clearing turns may not
have produced accurate results. If the aircraft are equipped with GPS that
record the aircraft’s flight path, the ground track could be examined for
evidence of clearing turns. Another alternative could include installing
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video cameras in the aircraft to observe clearing turn use. In lieu of
recording, the researcher could personally observe the training flights
without revealing to the participants the nature of the observations. It also
may be possible to conduct this study in a simulator that utilizes visuals
with the capability of introducing other aircraft as a collision hazard to
encourage participants to clear the area.
7. The training provided to the participants should cover the limitations of
any traffic systems that are installed in the aircraft. This could help
participants understand how to correctly use the traffic system and help
increase the importance of clearing turns.
8. While this study focused on a Part 141 flight program, future research
could be conducted in a Part 61 program, or compare the two types of
programs to ascertain if there are any differences in human factors and
clearing turn performance after implementing BBS.
9. The survey item concerning whether the FAA and the flight program
specified procedures for clearing turns should be revised to include a
space for participants to describe the procedure, so that it can be
determined what they believe the procedure to be.
10. Future research should include more opportunities for students and
instructors to interact with each other to facilitate peer encouragement
towards safe behavior.
In summary, it is important that flight training organizations continuously
evaluate the human factors that could be preventing safe behaviors. The HFACS model
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can be used to create a survey specific to the areas of concern to ensure that all human
factors are examined. This type of proactive approach could assist in preventing
accidents. While BBS was not shown to be effective in this study due to various
limitations, it has the potential to be effective in reducing unsafe behaviors; therefore, it
may be worthwhile for flight training organizations to pursue its use in the future.
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Appendix A

HFACS Student Survey

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the following questions and choose the response that
most closely reflects how you perform clearing turns while you are training in university
aircraft. Your responses will be completely anonymous, so please be honest in your
responses. NOTE: The following questions refer to this semester only.
1. How often do you do a clearing turn before a maneuver?
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
2. What are some of the reasons you don’t do clearing turns? Check all that
apply.
□ I forget.
□ My instructor told me not to.
□ They take time away from getting the lesson done.
□ They are not part of the procedures for the manuever.
□ The traffic system will alert me to other aircraft in the area.
□ The chances of me hitting another plane are slim.
□ They are not important.
□ Other, please describe:
3. My instructor makes sure that I complete clearing turns before beginning a
maneuver.
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
4. My instructor corrects me if I do not compete a clearing turn before a
maneuver.
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
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5. My instructor does not think clearing turns are important.
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
6. When I try to do a clearing turn, my instructor discourages it.
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
7. There are too many maneuvers in a lesson to do clearing turns and complete
the lesson
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
8. It is acceptable to not do a clearing turn if the lesson can be completed.
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
9. I am less likely to do a clearing turn if the weather is nice.
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
10. The FAA provides specific guidance on how to conduct a clearing turn (how
much heading change, amount of bank, etc.)
□ Yes
□ No
□ Not sure
11. The flight program (i.e. procedures manual, training) provides specific
guidance on how to conduct a clearing turn (how much heading change, amount
of bank, etc.)
□ Yes
□ No
□ Not sure
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12. Demographic Information
What flight course are you currently enrolled in?
□ Private Pilot
□ Commercial Pilot I
□ Commercial Pilot II
□ Commercial and Instrument
Approximately how many total flight hours do you currently have?
□ 0-40
□ 41-100
□ 101-200
□ 201 or greater
What is your age?
□ 18-21
□ 22-25
□ 26 and older
What is your gender?
□ Female
□ Male
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Appendix B

HFACS Instructor Survey

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the following questions and choose the response that
most closely reflects how you perform clearing turns while you are training in university
aircraft. Your responses will be completely anonymous, so please be honest in your
responses. NOTE: The following questions refer to this semester only.
1. How often do your students do a clearing turn before a maneuver?
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
2. What are some of the reasons your students don’t do clearing turns? Check
all that apply.
□ They forget.
□ I tell them not to.
□ They take time away from getting the lesson done.
□ They are not part of the procedures for the manuever.
□ The traffic system will alert me to other aircraft in the area.
□ The chances of us hitting another plane are slim.
□ They are not important.
□ Other, please describe:
3. I make sure that my students complete clearing turns before beginning a
maneuver.
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
4. I correct my students if they do not compete a clearing turn before a
maneuver.
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
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5. I do not think clearing turns are important.
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
6. When my student tries to do a clearing turn, I discourage it.
□ Always
□ Most of the time
□ Sometimes
□ Rarely
□ Never
7. There are too many maneuvers in a lesson to do clearing turns and complete
the lesson
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
8. It is acceptable to not do a clearing turn if the lesson can be completed.
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
9. I am less likely to have my student do a clearing turn if the weather is nice.
□ Strongly Agree
□ Agree
□ Undecided
□ Disagree
□ Strongly Disagree
10. The FAA provides specific guidance on how to conduct a clearing turn (how
much heading change, amount of bank, etc.)
□ Yes
□ No
□ Not sure
11. The flight program (i.e. procedures manual, training) provides specific
guidance on how to conduct a clearing turn (how much heading change, amount
of bank, etc.)
□ Yes
□ No
□ Not sure

95
12. Demographic Information
What flight instructor certificates do you currently possess? (Check all that apply)
□ CFI
□ CFII
□ MEI
□ BGI
□ AGI
□ IGI
Approximately how many total flight hours do you have?
□ 200-250
□ 251-500
□ 501-1000
□ 1000 or greater
Approximately how many hours of instruction have you given?
□ 0-40
□ 41-100
□ 101-200
□ 201-500
□ 501-1000
□ 1001 or greater
Are you a:
□ Part-time flight instructor
□ Full-time flight instructor
What is your age?
□ 18-21
□ 22-25
□ 26 and older
What is your gender?
□ Female
□ Male
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Appendix C

Experimental Group Observer Checklist

To calculate % Safe: Take the total number safe divided by the total number of
observations.

ID Number:

Completed by (circle one):
Instructor / Student

Date:

Time:

Instructions: Record the number of times you observe each safety practice and the
number of times you had a concern. Check the important positive practices you plan to
recognize and the significant concerns you plan to discuss, if any. Do not record the
names of persons.
Comments %
Number
(No
Safe
Safety Practice
Safe
Number of Concerns
Names)
Clearing turn initiated
prior to beginning
maneuver
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Appendix D

Control Group Observer Checklist

ID Number:

Completed by (circle one):
Instructor / Student

Date:

Time:

Instructions: Record the number of times a clearing turn was completed prior to
beginning a maneuver and when it was not completed. Do not record the names of
persons.
Yes
No
Comments (No Names)
Clearing turn initiated
prior to beginning
maneuver
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Appendix E

Letter to Students
Dear Student,
I am conducting a study about clearing turn use in the flight department. Please
take a few moments to complete the following survey. It will not take much of your
time, less than 5 minutes, and your input will help you and future students become safer
pilots. Please complete the survey by [date]. Your participation is voluntary and your
responses will remain anonymous. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in
this survey.

Thank you for your time!
Sincerely,
Ronda Cassens, Aviation Continuing Lecturer, Safety Officer
765-494-1532
rcassens@purdue.edu
James Greenan, Committee Chair
765-494-7314
jgreenan@purdue.edu
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Appendix F

Letter to Instructors
Dear Instructor,
I am conducting a study about clearing turn use in the flight department. Please
take a few moments to complete the following survey. It will not take much of your
time, less than 5 minutes, and your input will help your students become safer pilots.
Please complete the survey by [date]. Your participation is voluntary and your responses
will remain anonymous. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in this
survey.

Thank you for your time!
Sincerely,
Ronda Cassens, Aviation Continuing Lecturer, Safety Officer
765-494-1532
rcassens@purdue.edu
James Greenan, Committee Chair
765-494-7314
jgreenan@purdue.edu
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